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Comment
Just Say Know: The Rights of Putative
Fathers in New York to Veto the Adoption
of Their Children
I. Introduction
On February 8, 1991, in Iowa, Cara Clausen gave birth to a
baby girl.' She was not married, and had decided to give the
baby up for adoption.2 Clausen named Scott Seefeldt as the fa-
ther, and both Clausen and Seefeldt signed forms releasing cus-
tody and terminating their parental rights.3 The little girl was
placed with a couple from Michigan, who began adoption pro-
ceedings in Iowa on February 25, 1991.4 The couple, the
DeBoers, named their baby girl Jessica.5 Jessica went home
with the DeBoers that day.6
On March 6, 1991, nine days after the DeBoers filed their
adoption petition, Cara Clausen filed a separate petition revok-
ing her release of custody.7 Clausen admitted that she had lied
when she named Seefeldt as the father. 8 The man she now
named, Dan Schmidt, was proven to be Jessica's father to 99.9%
accuracy. 9 Schmidt himself filed a petition in Iowa to intervene
1. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Mich. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 653.
6. Id. at 652.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App.), aff'd in
part, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
The application of blood tests to the issue of paternity results from certain
properties of the human blood groups and types. If the blood groups and
223
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in the adoption proceeding started by the DeBoers. 10 Thus be-
gan a long and emotional series of jurisdictional battles, culmi-
nating in the sight the nation watched in horror the summer of
1993.11 The sight was that of little two and one-half year old
Jessica being forced from the arms of the only parents she had
ever known, to be carried away screaming by a social worker to
her new home with the Schmidts. There, she would be renamed
Anna.12
How common is this? For an adoptive parent in New York,
or for a couple perhaps contemplating adoption in New York,
the question is "Can this happen to me?" For men like Dan
Schmidt, the question is just as compelling: "Can the State of
New York prevent me from raising my own child?" This Com-
ment will focus on the rights of putative fathers 3 in New York
who may not know of the birth of their children until it is too
late,14 and whether they can veto an adoption that is not final,
types of the mother and child are known, the possible and impossible blood
groups and types of the true father can be determined under the rules of
inheritance. The ability of blood grouping tests to exonerate innocent puta-
tive fathers was confirmed by a 1976 report developed jointly by the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the American Medical Association. Miale,
Jennings, Rettberg, Sell & Krause, Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present
Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Disputed Parentage, 10 Family
L.Q. 247 (Fall 1976). The joint report recommended the use of seven blood
test "systems"- ABO, Rh, MNSS, Kell, Duffy, Kidd, and HLA - when investi-
gating questions of paternity. Id., at 257-258 [sic]. These systems were
found to be "reasonable" in cost and to provide a [93%] cumulative
probability of negating paternity for erroneously accused... white men.
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1981).
10. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
11. Michele Lesie, Baby Jessica Case Sparks Drive to Avoid More Like It,
PLAiN DEALER, Aug. 13, 1994, at F2.
12. Edward Walsh, Two Parents Too Many For a Little Girl; Michigan
Supreme Court Hears Emotional Adoption Case, WASH. POST, June 4, 1993, at C1.
13. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990). A "putative father" is the
"alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock." Id.
14. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(5) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994). Once
the necessary surrender agreements have been approved by the court and the child
is placed with the adoptive parents, there is a 30 day waiting period after which
the surrendering parents are barred from trying to revoke or annul the surrender
agreement. This does not preclude actions to annul the surrender agreement on
the bases of fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution or inducement of a surren-
der. Id.
In the cases selected for this Comment, typically there will be a putative fa-
ther whose consent to the adoption was not required under the statutory scheme
then in effect. Thus, the actions will not be to revoke a surrender, but to intervene
224
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or reverse an adoption that is final. It will also examine how
New York State tries to balance the interests of putative fathers
against the interests of adoptive parents. It further examines
the interests of the state in controlling adoption, and when the
court considers the best interests of the child. Part II of this
Comment will briefly summarize recent Supreme Court deci-
sions in this area, outlining the growth of putative fathers'
rights by focusing on Stanley v. Illinois,15 Quilloin v. Walcott,16
Caban v. Mohammed, 7 and Lehr v. Robertson.18 Part III will
focus specifically on how the law of New York has addressed the
rights of putative fathers to secure custody of their children
during the process of, or after, an adoption. In particular, Part
III will examine the interim standard for consent from In re Ra-
quel Marie X 19 when the child is less than six months old at the
time of the adoption and how each part of Raquel Marie's two-
part test 20 has been interpreted. Part III will also examine how
New York's common law defines the "best interests" of the child.
Part IV will analyze New York's adoption veto standards and
suggest how it might be possible for New York to give greater
rights to those putative fathers who do not know of the birth of
their children until after Raquel Marie's six month deadline for
manifesting parental responsibility has passed.
II. Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers
A. The Main Cases
1. Stanley v. Illinois 21
Until 1972, unwed fathers were presumed to be unfit and
neglectful parents.22 Indeed, until that time, the state could re-
move a child from her home following the death of her mother,
even if she had grown up with her father, simply because her
in adoption proceedings. The adoptions will be considered final after the 30 day
period following the mother's consent to the adoption.
15. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
16. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
17. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
18. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
19. 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990).
20. See infra part III.B.1.
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. Id. at 650.
19941 225
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parents were not wed to one another. 23 On the other hand, the
only way a state could remove a non-delinquent child from the
home of her married parents was to prove that they were unfit
as parents, and unable to provide adequate care. 24 Thus, the
state was discriminating against unwed fathers because of the
presumption that they were unfit.25
This was the issue brought before the Supreme Court in
Stanley v. Illinois.26 In Stanley, the father and mother formed a
household with their two children, although they were not mar-
ried to one another.27 Upon the death of the mother, the two
children were removed by the state from the father's household
and automatically declared wards of the state without a hearing
concerning his fitness as a parent.m The Supreme Court recog-
nized that this situation violated the father's Fourteenth
Amendment rights of due process and equal protection because
it discriminated against him by presuming that his marital sta-
tus was a direct reflection on his fitness as a parent.2 The
Court concluded that all parents were constitutionally entitled
to a fitness hearing before the state could remove their natural
23. Id.
24. Id. at 649 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1, 702-4 (1967) (repealed
1988)).
25. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. Under the pertinent Illinois statute, "parents"
were defined as "the father and mother of a legitimate child . . . or the natural
mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent." Id. at 650 (cit-
ing ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, § 701-14 (1967) (repealed 1988)) (emphasis added).
Thus, all mothers, regardless of marital status, were presumed fit as parents,
while unwed fathers were not presumed to be legal parents at all. The practical
effect was that "the State, on showing that the father was not married to the
mother, need not prove unfitness in fact, because it [was] presumed at law." Id.
26. Id. at 645.
27. Id. at 646.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 653-54. The Supreme Court had previously recognized that a par-
ent has a fundamental right to raise his or her child as he or she sees fit. See, e.g.,
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 746 (1982) (determining that proof of a parent's
unfitness must be clear and convincing before the parent-child relationship can be
terminated); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532 (1925) (providing that
an act requiring that all children be sent to public schools was an unconstitutional
interference with a parent's right to direct the education of children under his or
her control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (providing that a state
cannot prohibit the teaching of a language other than English in private schools
because it infringed upon the rights of parents to make educational decisions re-
garding their children).
226
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children from their custody.s0 However, Stanley did not deter-
mine the level of protection that the state must give to unwed
fathers when the state's interests are greater than those of a
father who had raised his own children.31
2. Quilloin v. Walcott
Six years later in Quilloin v. Walcott,32 the Supreme Court
considered a situation in which the father did not live with his
child, was not married to the child's mother, had only sporadic
visits with the child, and provided infrequent support pay-
ments.33 In that case, a mother wanted her new husband to
adopt her then eleven-year-old child.34 The putative father
chose not to seek custody for himself, but instead attempted to
block the adoption and to secure visitation rights.35 The Court
did not find him to be an unfit parent.36 However, the adoption
petition was granted37 because "the mother had recently con-
cluded that . . . contacts [between the child and the putative
father] were having a disruptive effect on the child,"38 and the
trial court found the adoptive father to be a "fit and proper per-
son to adopt the child."39 The putative father appealed, claim-
ing he was constitutionally entitled to an absolute veto over the
adoption proceedings unless there had been a finding that he
was unfit as a parent.40
The Supreme Court took the opportunity to narrow the
broad rights granted to biological parents in Stanley by holding
that the proposed adoption was in the "best interests of the
child."41 The Court also said that since the father had been
given notice and an opportunity to be heard, his due process
rights had not been violated. 42 The Court noted that the father
30. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 658.
31. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248 (1978).
32. 434 U.S. 246.
33. Id. at 247, 251.
34. Id. at 247.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 251.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 253.
41. Id. at 255.
42. Id. at 254.
1994] 227
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in Quilloin "ha[d] never shouldered any significant responsibil-
ity with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection,
or care of the child."43 Additionally, the Court emphasized that
the child was being adopted into an already existing family
unit."4 The Court thus gave more weight to the state's interest
in intact family adoptions over adoptions into a family that the
child had never known.45 The Court concluded that since this
father had not displayed any commitment to his child, it was
not in the best interests of the child to allow him to block the
child's adoption.4 6 The Court terminated this father's parental
rights, and allowed the mother's new husband to adopt the
child. 47
3. Caban v. Mohammed
Prior to Caban v. Mohammed,43 even a father such as Quil-
loin who had maintained a relationship with his child was not
allowed standing to consent to, or veto, an adoption without
first proving his fitness as a parent.49 In Caban, Abdiel Caban,
although legally married to another woman, lived with, and
held himself out to be the husband of Maria Mohammed. 50
They lived together for five years, during which time Moham-
med gave birth to two children by Caban.5' Caban was named
as the father on both children's birth certificates. 52 However, in
December 1973, Maria Mohammed took the children and moved
in with Kazin Mohammed, whom she married in January
1974.53 Caban saw his children weekly for the next nine
months until their maternal grandmother took them to live
with her in Puerto Rico. 54 In November 1975, Caban fraudu-
lently took the children from Puerto Rico and returned with
43. Id. at 256.
44. Id. at 255.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 256.
47. Id.
48. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
49. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 251 (1978).
50. Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
228 [Vol. 15:223
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them to New York.55 The family court ordered that the children
be returned to the temporary custody of the Mohammeds. 56
Both Mohammed and Caban, now remarried, began adoption
proceedings.57
After losing in both the surrogate court and the appellate
division, and then having his appeal to the New York Court of
Appeals dismissed, Caban appealed to the United States
Supreme Court on two grounds.5 8 First, Caban asserted that
New York's discrimination against unwed fathers violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 Sec-
ond, he argued that the Court's decision in Quilloin v. Walcott6 °
"recognized the due process rights of natural fathers to main-
tain a parental relationship with their children absent a finding
that they are unfit parents."61
The Supreme Court examined the plainly worded gender
distinction in New York's 1977 Domestic Relations Law section
111 to determine whether it was substantially related to an im-
portant governmental interest.62 The Court found, contrary to
55. Id. at 383.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 384-85.
59. Id. at 385.
60. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
61. Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
62. Id. at 388. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney 1977) permitted an un-
wed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their child simply by
withholding consent. Id. Because the statute discriminated based on gender, it
was subject to strict scrutiny to determine whether it was substantially related to
a significant governmental purpose. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388 (citing Craig v. Bo-
ren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)).
At the time of the proceedings before the Surrogate, § 111 read as follows:
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be
required as follows:
1. Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge
or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with such consent;
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a
child born in wedlock;
3. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of
wedlock;
4. Of any person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the
adoptive child.
The consent shall not be required of a parent who has abandoned the
child.... For the purposes of this section, evidence of insubstantial and
infrequent contacts by a parent with his or her child shall not, of itself, be
7
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the Mohammeds' assertions, that an unwed father could have
as active and affectionate a relationship with his children as an
unwed mother.6 3 The Court additionally found that the gender-
based distinction "does not bear a substantial relation to the
State's interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate
children." 4 The Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
does not protect a father who has never come forward to partici-
pate in the rearing of his child.65 Nevertheless, the Court read-
ily identified fathers such as Caban as having established a
substantial relationship with the child and having admitted pa-
ternity.66 Thus, the Court concluded that fathers should be af-
forded protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 67
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, examined the equal protec-
tion claim in more depth:
Gender, like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic
that has historically been the touchstone for pervasive but often
subtle discrimination. Although the analogy to race is not perfect
and the constitutional inquiry therefore somewhat different, gen-
der-based statutory classifications deserve careful constitutional
examination because they may reflect or operate to perpetuate
mythical or stereotyped assumptions about the proper roles and
the relative capabilities of men and women that are unrelated to
any inherent differences between the sexes.68
However, Justice Stewart's ultimate conclusion was that men
and women "are simply not similarly situated" to be given equal
rights as parents.69 To support this, Justice Stewart pointed to
the "physical reality that only the mother carries and gives
birth to the child, as well as the undeniable social reality that
the unwed mother is always an identifiable parent and the cus-
todian of the child."70 Thus, Stewart concluded that New York's
"reality" based statute, which did not favor fathers who had no
sufficient as a matter of law to preclude a finding that such parent has aban-
doned such child.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977), cited in Caban, 441 U.S. at 385 n.4.
63. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389.
64. Id. at 391.
65. Id. at 392.
66. Id. at 393.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 399.
230 [Vol. 15:223
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relationship to the child, did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was thus
constitutional. 7 1
Justice Stevens also dissented, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice Rehnquist. 72 These justices acknowledged that
from the time of the pregnancy, the mother has control over
whether to terminate the pregnancy, whether to reveal the fa-
ther, and whether she should marry the father or someone
else.73 In this sense, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Stew-
art that New York's Domestic Relations Law did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.74 In addition, the dissent found that
since the father had notice and an opportunity to present evi-
dence regarding the child's best interests, 75 the statute did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76
4. Lehr v. Robertson
The last significant constitutional decision in this area was
Lehr v. Robertson.77 In Lehr, the putative father had lived with
the mother prior to the child's birth.78 Nevertheless, Lehr was
not named on the birth certificate as the child's father, and
never provided financial support.79 The mother married an-
other man, Robertson, and two years later consented to Robert-
son's adoption of her daughter.80 Since Lehr had not registered
with New York's Putative Father Registry,8' he was not notified
of the adoption proceedings that had begun in Ulster County,
New York.8 2 He also did not qualify for notice under the then
existing Domestic Relations Law section 111-a, enacted to give
71. Id.
72. Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 404-05.
74. Id. at 407. Justice Stevens noted that "real differences [between men and
women] justify a rule that gives the mother of the newborn infant the exclusive
right to consent to its adoption." Id.
75. Id. at 414.
76. Id. at 406 n.13.
77. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
78. Id. at 252.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 250.
81. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1988) (establishing a registry
which affords putative fathers an opportunity to be heard in the event of a legal
change of custody). See also infra text accompanying notes 276-79.
82. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-51.
1994]
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notice of termination of parental rights to unwed fathers.8 3 Af-
ter the mother and Robertson began the adoption proceeding,
Lehr filed a visitation and paternity action in the Westchester
County Family Court. 4 The Ulster County judge stayed the pa-
ternity proceeding until he could rule on a motion to change the
venue of that proceeding to Ulster County. 5 It was then that
Lehr learned of the adoption proceeding in Ulster.86 Although
the Ulster County judge was aware of the petition for paternity
(since he had stayed the proceeding), he signed the adoption or-
der because "he did not believe he was required to give notice to
[the father] prior to the entry of the order of adoption."87 On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Lehr argued on
both due process and equal protection grounds.8
8
The Court first addressed the due process claim.89 The
Court balanced the state's "paramount interest in the welfare of
children"90 against the parent's liberty interest in raising his or
her child.91 The differences between the already developed par-
ent-child relationships in Stanley and Caban and the potential
relationships in Quilloin and Lehr were "both clear and signifi-
cant.... [T]he mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection."92 Thus, a demonstrated
relationship must have developed between father and child
83. Id. at 251. Essentially, Lehr had not been adjudicated to be the father of
the child, nor had he begun proceedings to be so named; he was not listed as the
father on the child's birth certificate, was not living openly with the mother, and
was not married to the child's mother. Id. See also infra note 96 and accompany-
ing text.
84. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252.
85. Id. at 252-53.
86. Id. at 253.
87. Id. Caban, 441 U.S. 380 was decided two months after the entry of the
Lehr adoption order in the Ulster County Court. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 254 n.7. On
Lehr's appeal to the appellate division, the court held that Caban should not be
applied retroactively, thus forcing Lehr to effectively re-argue the constitutional
issues already settled in Caban. Id. at 253.
88. Id. at 255.
89. Id. at 256.
90. Id. at 257.
91. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also
supra note 29.
92. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261.
232 [Vol. 15:223
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before that relationship can be found deserving of constitutional
protection.93
In addressing the equal protection claim, the Court again
emphasized the existence or non-existence of a substantial rela-
tionship between parent and child in evaluating the best inter-
ests of the child.94 The Court summarily concluded that
because there was no relationship to protect, the New York law
was not denying Lehr any constitutional protection.95 Lehr,
therefore, initiated a two-tiered standard of analysis to deter-
mine the rights of putative fathers: (1) is the putative father
deserving of notice,9 and if so, (2) can he demonstrate fitness as
a parent?97
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun,
strongly dissented.98 Adopting an entirely different reading of
the "facts,"99 the dissent concluded that Lehr was never afforded
notice or an opportunity to be heard.100 Thus, Lehr's due pro-
cess rights had been violated.10 1 The dissenting justices con-
cluded that the state must make a reasonable effort to
determine the identity of the father and give him adequate
notice. 0 2
93. Id. at 259. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
94. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-67.
95. Id. at 267.
96. Id. at 263-64. See infra note 108.
97. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267, An unwed father can demonstrate fitness as a par-
ent by showing that he has established custodial, personal or financial relation-
ships with the child. Id.
98. Id. at 268 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 268-69.
100. Id. at 271 (questioning the quality and quantity of the factual record in
the lower courts, noting that Lehr's legitimation proceedings were stayed and then
dismissed on the mother's motions, and chiding the majority for not assuming that
Lehr's allegations are true-that "but for the actions of the child's mother there
would have been the kind of significant relationship that the majority concedes is
entitled to the full panoply of procedural due process protections").
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id. at 272-73.
1994] 233
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III. New York's Domestic Relations Law
A. The Law
After the Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Illinois,103
and Caban v. Mohammed,10 4 the New York Legislature ap-
pointed special commissions to address the issue of the putative
father's due process rights.10 5 Their function was to better pro-
tect the interests of putative fathers, while still protecting the
interests of the child and the interests of the state to procure
final and prompt adoptions. 10 6 The result was the enactment of
Domestic Relations Law section 111-a in 1980.107 The new law
requires notice to seven categories of fathers who were likely to
have already assumed some responsibility for the care of their
children under the age of six months at the time of the adop-
tion. 08 These categories include men adjudicated by a court to
103. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
104. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
105. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263.
106. Id. at 263 n.20.
The measure is intended to codify the minimum protection for the putative
father which Stanley would require. In so doing it reflects policy decisions to
(a) codify constitutional requirements; (b) clearly establish, as early as pos-
sible in a child's life, the rights, interests and obligations of all parties; (c)
facilitate prompt planning for the future of the child and permanence of his
status; and (d) through the foregoing, promote the best interest of children.
Id. (quoting App. to Appellant's Brief at C-15, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983) (No. 81-1756)).
107. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994). See Ch.
575, § 1, 1980 N.Y. Laws 1046 (McKinney).
108. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a(1)(d). Categories of persons who must be
notified include:
a) persons adjudicated by a court of New York to be a father;
b) persons adjudicated by another United States court to be the father, when
a certified copy of the court order has been filed with the putative father registry,
pursuant to § 372-c of the Social Services Law;
c) any person who has filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity,
pursuant to § 372-c of the Social Services Law;
d) any person recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's father;
e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the
time of the proceeding and who is holding himself out to be the child's father;
f0 any person who has been identified as the father by the mother in a written,
sworn statement;
g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months subse-
quent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument.
Id. See also In re Adoption of Jessica XX, 54 N.Y.2d 417, 425 n.5, 430 N.E.2d 896,
899 n.5, 446 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 n.5 (1981).
234
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be the father, fathers who have filed with the Putative Father
Registry,10 9 fathers named on birth certificates, and fathers who
have married the mother or lived with her and their child dur-
ing the six month period prior to the adoption.11o
In response to Caban, the legislature amended section 111
to require the consent of unwed fathers in specific circum-
stances where the father was likely to have created a relation-
ship with his child."' These changes supported fathers who
had "unambiguously manifested ... a substantial, continuous,
meaningful family relationship," 1 2 but prevented fathers who
merely wanted to frustrate adoptions from doing so.113
109. See supra note 81.
110. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111-a(2) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
111. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(1)(d), (e) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994).
112. In re Raquel Marie X, 76 N.Y.2d 387, 399, 559 N.E.2d 418, 422, 559
N.Y.S.2d 855, 859 (1990).
113. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(d) (McKinney 1988). The text in relevant
part states:
If the child is placed with the adoptive parents more than six months after
the child's birth, the father must have maintained substantial and continu-
ous or repeated contact with the child as manifested by:
1) the payment by the father toward the support of the child of a fair
and reasonable sum, according to the father's means, and either
2) the father's visiting the child at least monthly when physically and
financially able to do so and not prevented from doing so by the person
or agency having care or custody of the child, or
3) the father's regular communication with the child or with the person
or agency having custody of the child, when physically and financially
unable to visit the child or prevented from doing so by the person or
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child. A father who
openly lived with the child for a period of six months within the one
year period immediately preceding the placement of the child for adop-
tion and who during such period openly held himself out to be the father
of such child shall be deemed to have maintained substantial and con-
tinuous contact with the child.
Id. (emphasis added).
If the child was placed for adoption under the age of six months, the
father's consent is required if:
1) [the] father openly lived with the child or the child's mother for a
continuous period of six months immediately preceding the placement
of the child for adoption; and
2) such father openly held himself out to be the father of the child; and
3) such father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his
means, for the medical, hospital, and nursing expenses incurred in con-
nection with the mother's pregnancy.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(1)(e) (McKinney 1988) (emphasis added).
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B. Consent
1. The Raquel Marie Two-Prong Test
New York's attempt to establish a constitutional standard
for determining when a putative father's consent was necessary
was declared unconstitutional in 1990 by the New York Court of
Appeals in In re Raquel Marie X.114 In Raquel Marie, the fa-
ther, Miguel, knew of his girlfriend's pregnancy and had lived
with her on and off over a period of five years. 115 Raquel Marie
was their second child together. 16 Unfortunately, Raquel
Marie was born during a time when her father and mother were
fighting and incompatible. 1 7 Miguel tried living with his
daughter and girlfriend for a week before leaving because he
"didn't feel safe staying there."" 8
The New York Court of Appeals balanced the interests of
the state with those of the father, noting that the "living to-
gether" requirement" 9 contributed nothing towards promoting
quick, permanent adoptions, and in fact, gave the biological
mother an easy way to prevent the father from interfering with
her choice to give the child up for adoption.120 Emphasizing the
relationship between the father and mother, rather than the re-
lationship between the father and child, the court also found
that this requirement does not further the state's interest in de-
termining parental responsibility for that child.'2 ' Thus, sub-
section (1)(e)(i) of section 111 of the Domestic Relations Law
114. 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990) [hereinafter Ra-
quel Marie III. Raquel Marie H is actually a consolidation of two cases: In re Ra-
quel Marie, 150 A.D.2d 23, 545 N.Y.S.2d 379 (2d Dep't 1988) [hereinafter Raquel
Marie I]; and In re Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d 905, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sur. Ct. N.Y.
County 1988). For discussion of In re Baby Girl S., see infra part III.B.6.
115. Raquel Marie 1, 150 A.D.2d at 25, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
116. Id.
117. In re Raquel Marie X, 173 A.D.2d 709, 713, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604, 607 (2d
Dep't 1991) [hereinafter Raquel Marie III]. Raquel Marie's mother had gone so far
as to file criminal charges against Miguel for assault and non-payment of child
support. Id.
118. Raquel Marie I, 150 A.D.2d at 25, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
119. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(e)(i) (McKinney 1988) (requiring that the
father openly live with the child or the child's mother for a continuous period of six
months prior to the adoption).
120. Raquel Marie H, 76 N.Y.2d at 405-06, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
863.
121. Id. at 406, 559 N.E.2d at 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
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was declared unconstitutional. 122 Additionally, the remaining
two sections of subsection (1)(e) were stricken because of the
court's understanding that the legislature would not want them
to stand alone.123 The court then developed an interim standard
for determining a putative father's rights to consent to or veto
an adoption. 124 First, the unwed father must be willing to as-
sume full custody of the child himself, and not merely block the
adoption. 25 At this stage, the court would consider the question
of unfitness or abandonment. 26 Second, the manifestation of
parental responsibility must be prompt.127 Towards this end,
the Court of Appeals adopted the six-month period prior to the
adoption, prescribed in Domestic Relations Law section
111(1)(e), as the time during which parental responsibility must
be demonstrated. 28 The New York Court of Appeals also ad-
vised lower courts, when considering this question in the future,
to examine whether the father openly acknowledged paternity,
paid pregnancy and birthing expenses, or took steps to "estab-
lish legal responsibility" for the child.129
On remand,130 the appellate division found that Miguel,
the putative father, had not manifested prompt parental re-
sponsibility.131 There, the court found that Miguel's contribu-
tions to the medical expenses of Louise, the mother, were half-
hearted at best.132 Secondly, although Miguel had filed a cus-
tody petition three days prior to Raquel Marie's placement for
122. Id. at 406, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
123. Id. at 406-07, 559 N.E.2d at 427, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864.
124. Id. at 407-08, 559 N.E.2d at 427-28, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 864-65. As of the
time of publication, there have been several different legislative proposals to the
1991 and 1992 legislatures; however, none have been enacted, and the interim
standards are still in place. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a commentary at 109-10
(McKinney Supp. 1995).
125. Raquel Marie II, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
865. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. Raquel Marie 11, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
865.
127. Id. See discussion infra parts III.B.4-5.
128. Raquel Marie II, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
865.
129. Id.
130. Raquel Marie III, 173 A.D.2d 709, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604.
131. Id. at 711, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 605.
132. Id. at 712-13, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 606-07. Miguel had paid most of Louise's
expenses with checks from his father even though he was employed throughout the
time in question. Id. at 712-13, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
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adoption, the court found that Miguel had not taken legal action
to establish his paternity.133 Lastly, the court examined Mi-
guel's abusive behavior towards Louise in general,'3 and his
lack of support for his other daughter by Louise.135 The court
concluded that Miguel was unwilling to accept parental respon-
sibility for Raquel Marie. 13
2. In re John E.: Prong One
In the case of In re John E.137 decided five months after Ra-
quel Marie, the court tested the first prong of the interim stan-
dard.138 In John E., John, the petitioner and biological father,
was involved in an affair with a married woman.139 The child,
Daniel, was born while the mother was living with her hus-
band.140 Daniel was placed with the respondents, the adoptive
parents, for private adoption immediately after his birth.'4 '
One month later, John petitioned the court for an order of filia-
tion so that he would be recognized as Daniel's father,142 and
therefore gain custody of Daniel. 143 The human leucocyte anti-
gen (HLA) test proved John's paternity to 99.93% accuracy.'"
The Rockland County Family Court did not complete the "best
interests" hearing until Daniel was twenty-two months old.145
Despite these efforts, the appellate division found that "the best
interests of Daniel would clearly be served by permitting him to
remain with the only parents he had known since his birth
133. Id. at 711-12, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 606.
134. Id. at 713-14, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
135. Id. at 714, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 607-08.
136. Id. at 714, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 608.
137. 164 A.D.2d 375, 564 N.Y.s.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1990).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 376, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Because Daniel was born while his mother was married, there was a
legal presumption that his mother's husband was also Daniel's natural father. A
mere plurality of the Supreme Court found this presumption to be constitutional.
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (confirming the constitutionality
of a California statute (CAL. EVID. CODE § 621) providing that a child born to a
married woman living with her husband is presumed to be a child of the marriage
and the presumption can only be rebutted by the husband or wife).
143. 164 A.D.2d at 376, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
144. Id.; see supra note 9.
145. 164 A.D.2d at 376-77, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
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three years ago."1 46 The court determined that John had paid
for the mother's first visit to the obstetrician, and that John had
contacts with both the natural mother and her sister after the
mother's return to her husband's home. 147 Even though John
had filed a request for filiation and custody one month after
Daniel's birth, the appellate division denied that he "took any
steps whatever during this period to establish his legal respon-
sibility for the child."148 The court explained this "puzzl[e]" by
examining petitioner's motive for seeking custody, and his fu-
ture arrangements for Daniel. 149 Since John was unmarried
and employed full time, he planned on placing Daniel in his
adult daughter's day care center during the day.150 The court
concluded that John's "manifestation of interest in his now 3-
year-old child-a child whom he has never known-was neither
sufficiently prompt nor sufficiently substantial to require consti-
tutional protection."' 5'
Unfortunately, the slow pace of the proceeding influenced
the two justices who may have otherwise dissented from the
John E. decision. 5 2 The plurality referred to the "wrenching
uprooting,"' 53 the "'devastating' psychological effects," 154 and
the "serious damage" facing Daniel if removed from the home of
his adoptive parents. 55 Had the proceeding not lasted three
years, these two justices may have agreed with the dissenting
justice, who vehemently attacked the plurality's "tortured read-
146. Id. at 379, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 380, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 442. The court refers to the period of time
provided by the New York Domestic Relations Law. This period is the six months
prior to the child's adoption when the putative father was aware of the pregnancy.
Id.
149. Id. at 381, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 443-44. The "puzzle" referred to constitutes
the reasons why the father did not establish paternity during the six month period
prior to the child's adoption. Id. Here, the father's purported reasons for not es-
tablishing paternity were that the father himself was raised by foster parents and
strongly believed that an important bonding occurs between a child and his biolog-
ical parents. Id. The court concluded, however, that this justification was merely
an attempt to block the adoption. Id.
150. Id. at 382, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 388, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 447-48 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 386, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 446.
154. Id. at 387, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
155. Id.
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ing of the hearing testimony."156 However, the plurality was
able to use the petitioner's choice of care for Daniel as a means
to deny petitioner custody under the interim standard. 157
3. In re Stephen C.
In an analogous case, In re Stephen C. ,58 the father learned
of the birth of his child after the adoption proceeding had be-
gun. 59 A family court order granted judgment against the fa-
ther. 60 However, the court in Raquel Marie had not found the
"living together" requirement unconstitutional at the time of
that proceeding. 16' On appeal, the court granted a best inter-
ests hearing since by that time the court in Raquel Marie had
invalidated New York Domestic Relations Law section
lll(1)(e)(i).162
The father in Stephen C. was denied custody because he
was unwilling to assume full custody himself. 63 The father did
not feel that he could raise his child himself and wanted to place
the child with his grandmother in Puerto Rico or his sister in
Texas. 64 In fact, the father was in jail at the time of the hear-
ing. 65 These cases, therefore, provide little hope for putative
fathers seeking custody. 66
156. Id. at 391, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 450 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 382, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444. In contrast, at the home of Daniel's
adoptive parents, both parents were professionals. Id. There, the adoptive mother
would care for Daniel during the day, except for two days during the week, when
she worked. Id. During those days, a babysitter would care for Daniel. Id. The
court's bias is clearly evident in the choice of wording for the type of care Daniel
would receive. For example, although both the adoptive parents and John planned
to leave Daniel with other caregivers, the adoptive parents' caregiver was referred
to as a "babysitter," id. at 382, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444, while the natural father's
caregiver was referred to as "day care." Id. at 381-82, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
158. 170 A.D.2d 1035, 566 N.Y.S.2d 178 (4th Dep't 1991).
159. Id. at 1036, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
160. Id. at 1035, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
161. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
162. Id. at 1035-36, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 179. Domestic Relations Law section
111(1)(e)(i) requires in pertinent part that the "father openly live with the child or
the child's mother for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the
placement of the child for adoption." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(1)(e)(i) (McKinney
1988).
163. Stephen C., 170 A.D.2d at 1035-36, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 179.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., In re John E., 164 A.D.2d 375,564 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1990).
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4. In re Kiran Chandini S.: Prong Two
If the court is satisfied that the putative father is willing to
assume full custody himself, the court will then look to see if he
has promptly manifested an intent to assume parental respon-
sibility.167 In In re Kiran Chandini S.,168 a father was able to
satisfy this test and receive a hearing as to the best interests of
his child. 169 The father apparently did not appeal the decree of
custody.170 In addition, the record before the appellate division
was insufficient to resolve the question of custody. 171 Conse-
quently, the case was remanded. 172 Thus, the court gave this
father no more than standing to seek custody of his own child. 173
The family court and the appellate division accepted the evi-
dence that the father had offered to pay for the pregnancy and
birth expenses of the mother, but she refused his offer since she
had already received funds from the state. 174 The appellate di-
vision also affirmed the family court's finding that the father
publicly acknowledged his paternity in the six months prior to
the adoption.175 Lastly, the court found that because the child
was placed for adoption without the father's notice, the father
had not abandoned his daughter. 176
5. In re Robert 0.
Finally, the recent case of In re Robert 0. 177 measured
"promptness" in terms of the life of the child, rather than from
the point of the father's knowledge of the birth.178 In Robert 0.,
the father and mother were engaged to be married and were
167. Raquel Marie 11, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
865. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
168. 166 A.D.2d 599, 560 N.Y.S.2d 886 (2d Dep't 1990).
169. Id. at 601, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. It is interesting to note that the court remanded to determine
whether there were "any 'extraordinary circumstances' which would permit an in-
quiry into the question of what custody arrangement would be in the child's best
interests." Id. (citation omitted).
173. Id. See also discussion infra part III.C (discussing the best interests of
the child).
174. 166 A.D.2d at 601, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. 80 N.Y.2d 254, 604 N.E.2d 99, 590 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1992).
178. Id. at 264, 604 N.E.2d at 103, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
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living together at the time of conception. 179 However, because
they disagreed about when to marry, the mother cancelled their
engagement. s0 The father left their home without ever know-
ing of the mother's pregnancy.' 8 ' The mother surrendered cus-
tody without naming the father, and the court did not ask her to
reveal the father's identity during the adoption proceeding.18 2
Eighteen months after the birth, the mother and biological fa-
ther reconciled and she told him of the child. 83 In an effort to
assert his parental rights, the father promptly registered with
the Putative Father Registry, reimbursed the mother for all
birthing expenses, and filed to vacate the adoption. 84
In sustaining the validity of the adoption, the court
stressed the state's interest in providing permanent, stable
homes for adopted children. 8 5 On appeal, the father contended
that because "New York laws fail to require notice and consent
from a father in his position, they den[ied] [him] a constitu-
tional liberty interest" in raising his own child.186 His proposed
solution was to require a judicial determination of the identity
of the biological father by requiring unwed mothers to testify as
to paternity.187
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed
the lower court's opinion, again emphasizing the state's con-
cerns for: 1) prompt and certain adoption procedures, 2) the best
interests of the child, and 3) protecting the rights of interested
third parties like the adoptive parents, when weighing the
rights of putative fathers.18 The court determined that the rel-
evant timetable of concern is the child's. 189 Regardless of
whether the father acted promptly once he became aware of the
child, the court maintained that "[p]romptness is measured in
terms of the baby's life, not by the onset of the father's aware-
179. Id. at 259, 604 N.E.2d at 100, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
180. In re Robert O., 173 A.D.2d 30, 31, 578 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595 (2d Dep't 1991).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 31-32, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
183. Id. at 32, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 35, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
186. Robert 0., 80 N.Y.2d at 261, 604 N.E.2d at 101, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
187. Id. at 261, 604 N.E.2d at 101-02, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 39-40.
188. Id. at 264,604 N.E.2d at 103, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (citingLehr, 463 U.S. at
263-66).
189. Id. at 264-65, 604 N.E.2d at 103-04, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 41-42.
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ness."19 0 In addition, the court recognized the state's interests
in finalizing adoptions.'19 It stated that rearranging the lives of
the adoptive family unit more than a year after the adoption
became final did not promote the stability necessary for the
child.192 Lastly, the majority found that while "regrettable," pe-
titioner's inaction during the pregnancy was "solely attributable
to him."1 93
The concurring judge disagreed with the basis for the
court's opinion, and instead favored the conclusion for public
policy reasons. 94 The concurrence asserted that "in this age of
sexual permissiveness,"195 the court was imposing an "unrealis-
tic burden" on the "multitudes of men who .. .have intimate
relations with women to whom they are not married." 96 He fur-
ther contended that "a rule which places the onus on the man to
investigate whether a woman with whom he is no longer inti-
mate has become pregnant is simply out-of-step with modern
mores and the realities of contemporary heterosexual liai-
sons."197 Nonetheless, the court agreed that petitioner's consti-
tutional interest was "slight," though not extinguished, because
of the weighty state interest in the finality of adoptions. 98
6. In re Baby Girl S.: A Case of Fraud
It is possible, as in the Baby Girl Clausen'99 case, that the
natural mother of the child will commit a fraud upon the court.
In In re Baby Girl S. ,200 the court reversed an adoption because
the adoptive parents and the natural mother schemed to pre-
vent the family court judge from discovering the natural fa-
190. Id. at 264, 604 N.E.2d at 103, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 264-65, 604 N.E.2d at 104, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
193. Id. at 265, 604 N.E.2d at 104, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
194. Id. at 267, 604 N.E.2d at 105, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (Titone, J., concurring).
195. Id. at 268, 604 N.E.2d at 106, 590 N.Y.S. 2d at 44.
196. Id. at 267-68, 604 N.E.2d at 106, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
197. Id. at 268, 604 N.E.2d at 106, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
198. Id. at 270, 604 N.E.2d at 107, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 45.
199. 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). In Clausen, the natural mother committed
a fraud upon the court in order to proceed in the adoption of her child unhindered
by the effects of giving notice to the natural father of the child or of receiving his
consent. Id. at 652.
200. 141 Misc. 2d 905, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1988).
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ther's existence and his resistance to the adoption. 20' The
surrogate's court in Baby Girl S. firmly condemned any kind of
fraud committed against the court.20 2
In Baby Girl S., the natural mother prevented Gustavo, the
natural father, from living with her because she was still mar-
ried to another man.20 3 Regina, the natural mother, was con-
cerned that her relationship with Gustavo would jeopardize her
petition for the custody of her nine-year-old son in her pending
divorce proceeding. 20 4 Originally, Regina told Gustavo that she
thought she was pregnant, but later told him that she was not,
and ended their relationship. 20 5 Regina learned about the adop-
tive parents, two attorneys, through a newspaper advertise-
ment placed by the adoptive parents and their attorney.2° Not
long after this, Gustavo discovered that Regina was indeed
pregnant with his child. 207 He offered to marry Regina, but she
refused. 208 Gustavo then served Regina with paternity pa-
pers.209 Regina discussed the allegations with the adoptive par-
ents, who were both attorneys.210 Either for "medical reasons,"
or because she was so advised, Regina did not appear in court to
answer Gustavo's allegations.211 One week later, Baby Girl S.
was born, and Regina signed the consent-to-adoption forms sup-
plied to her by the adoptive parents' attorney.21 2 Regina used
her maiden name on the release forms to prevent Gustavo from
discovering the baby's birth in case he had filed with the Puta-
tive Father Registry.213 At the court appearance to finalize the
adoption, Regina did not inform the judge about Gustavo. 21 4
Under the technical requirements of Domestic Relations Law
section 111(1)(e), still in effect at the time, Gustavo's consent
201. Id. at 911-12, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
202. Id. at 912, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
203. Id. at 908, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 908, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678-79.
206. Id. at 908, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
207. Id. at 909, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
208. Id. at 908, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
209. Id. at 909, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
210. Id. at 909, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 678-79.
211. Id. at 909, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 910, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
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was not required because he had not lived with Regina for the
six months preceding the adoption.215 However, since the adop-
tive parents knew of Gustavo's paternity action in another ju-
risdiction, they had a duty to inform the court of this other
"interested party."216
The court condemned the actions of the adoptive parents,
calling their actions, "a blatant attempt to make an end run
around the Family Court proceedings." 217 It characterized the
adoption proceeding as "permeated with fraud and misrepre-
sentation."218 For this reason alone, the court dismissed the
adoption. 219 In dicta, the court reasoned that by initiating pro-
ceedings for custody, Gustavo held himself out to be the fa-
ther.220 Also, the court found that by "seeking a declaration of
his paternity of Regina's unborn child, Gustavo obligated him-
self to support his child."22 ' Thus, Gustavo had satisfied two of
the three criteria listed in New York's Domestic Relations Law
section 111(1)(e). 222 Lastly, the court recognized Gustavo's re-
peated proposals of marriage, and his offer to support and gain
custody of the child. 223 It concluded that he was prevented at all
times from fulfilling the final requirement of Domestic Rela-
tions Law section 111(1)(e), the "living together"
requirement. 224
Under today's post Raquel Marie225 standard, if the court
had asked Regina to identify any parties deserving of notice
under Domestic Relations Law section 111-a, she would have
been required to name Gustavo.2 26 Fortunately, the court ap-
plied the "savings clause" of Domestic Relations Law section
111(1)(d) to subsection (1)(e). 227 Subsection 111(1)(d), which re-
215. Id.
216. Id. at 910-11, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80. The court noted the adoptive par-
ents were attorneys but did not base the duty on that fact. Id.
217. Id. at 911, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
218. Id. at 912, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 914, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
221. Id.
222. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(e).
223. Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d at 914, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
224. Id.
225. 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990).
226. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111-a(1)(d). See supra note 108.
227. Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d at 916, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
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quires the father to visit or live with the child or mother, 228 pro-
vides fathers a legal safety net when they are "prevented from
[meeting the requirements] of [section] 111(1)(d) by the person
or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child."229 In
applying the savings clause from subsection (1)(d) to (1)(e), the
court relied on the legislative history of the statute. 230 It con-
cluded that the intent behind the savings clause was to "safe-
guard the constitutional rights of an unwed father who has
manifested a significant continuous interest in his child but was
prevented from implementing it."231 Consequently, the court
reached a satisfactory interpretation of the statute as a whole
without finding subsection (1)(e) unconstitutional. 232
C. "Best Interests of the Child"
The final hurdle that putative fathers must overcome
before receiving custody is what is commonly called the "best
interests of the child" hearing. 233 A "best interests" hearing
would theoretically be held after a father has shown a willing-
ness to assume full custody and a prompt manifestation of pa-
rental responsibility. 234 However, as has been demonstrated, it
is initially difficult to meet the court's requirements for stand-
ing.235 Additionally, since the evidence for a best interests hear-
ing would duplicate the evidence presented to show
manifestation of parental responsibility, the court may not al-
low a separate hearing.236 Finally, the court may decide that
228. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 111(1)(d)(ii), (iii) (McKinney 1988).
229. Id.
230. Baby Girl S., 141 Misc. 2d at 916, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
231. Id. at 915, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
232. Id. at 917, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
233. See Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 825 (1976).
234. Raquel Marie 11, 76 N.Y.2d at 401, 559 N.E.2d at 424, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
861.
235. See supra part II.A.
236. See In re Female Infant F., 191 A.D.2d 437, 438, 594 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305
(2d Dep't 1993). Here, the father was entitled to, and given, notice of the adoption
"for the purpose of allowing him to present evidence concerning the best interests
of the child." Id. The court then rejected the contention that, after a hearing to
determine whether the father's consent is required, there should be a separate best
interests hearing. Id. The court used the language of Domestic Relations Law
§ 111-a itself, stating that "the 'sole purpose' of the notice provision is to enable the
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even if the father is deemed fit to receive custody, it may be
denied to him because of "extraordinary circumstances."237
1. Bennett v. Jeffreys
The New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of "ex-
traordinary circumstances" in Bennett v. Jeffreys. 238 Although
Bennett was decided prior to the development of most of the pu-
tative fathers' rights,239 and did not deal with fathers at all,
Bennett was integral in defining what is called the "best inter-
ests of the child."240 In Bennett, the natural mother was a fif-
teen-year-old girl who allowed her mother's friend to take
custody of her daughter after the child was born.241 The friend,
Mrs. Jeffreys, intended to adopt the child, but never did.242
When the natural mother reached the age of twenty-three, she
attempted to regain custody of her daughter, who was then
eight. 243 The mother was about to graduate from college, and
was living with her parents, who were supportive of the child's
return to their home. 244 On the other hand, by the time of the
hearing, Mrs. Jeffreys was "separated from her husband ... em-
ployed as a domestic, and, on occasion,... kept the child in a
motel."245 Since there had been no adoption, the sole issue was
whether it was in the child's best interests to return her to her
mother, even after a prolonged separation which had not been
due to the mother's abandonment or neglect. 246
person served to 'present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the
child.'" Id. (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111-a(3) (McKinney 1988)).
The court also conducted such a "best interests" hearing in In re Stephen C., to
determine that the father's consent to the adoption was not required. 170 A.D.2d
1035, 566 N.Y.S.2d 178 (4th Dep't 1991).
237. Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 544, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823. See
also In re Kiran Chandini S., 166 A.D.2d 599, 601, 560 N.Y.S.2d 886, 888 (2d Dep't
1990) (remanding for a further hearing to determine if "extraordinary circum-
stances" exist).
238. Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 544, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
239. Bennett was decided prior to Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978),
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), and Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248
(1983). See supra parts HI.A.2-4 for discussion of these cases.
240. Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 549, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
241. Id. at 544, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 544-45, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823-24.
244. Id. at 545, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823-24.
245. Id. at 545, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824.
246. Id. at 545, 356 N.E.2d at 280, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
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The court acknowledged that there had been a "shifting" in
constitutional thinking, giving children rights that are at least
as great in constitutional weight as those of adults.247 Addition-
ally, if there was a conflict between the interests of the child in
being in a stable home and the interests of the natural parent in
keeping that child, the child's would be superior.248 Further,
the court stated that "the day is long past.., when the right of
a parent to the custody of his or her child, where extraordinary
circumstances are present, would be enforced inexorably, con-
trary to the best interest of the child, on the theory solely of an
absolute legal right."249
The question thus becomes, what are the "best interests" of
the child? The court's answer rejects traditional notions of best
interests in favor of a more flexible and practical approach in a
custody proceeding:
The child's "best interest" is not controlled by whether the natural
parent or non-parent would make a "better" parent, or by whether
the parent or non-parent would afford the child a "better" back-
ground or superior creature comforts. Nor is the child's best in-
terest controlled alone by comparing the depth of love and
affection between the child and those who vie for its custody. In-
stead ... the court is guided by principles which reflect a "consid-
ered social judgments in this society respecting family and
parenthood... [which] do not... dictate that the child's custody
be routinely awarded to the natural parent."250
In Bennett, the trial court named as the extraordinary cir-
cumstances the "protracted separation of mother from child."2
51
The court tempered this condition by combining it with other
factors: the mother's dependance on her parents for housing;
the fact that she was not married; and the child's attachment to
247. Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 825.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281,387 N.Y.S.2d at 824-25. Some examples of
extraordinary circumstances given by the court were surrender, abandonment,
persisting neglect, unfitness, and unfortunate or involuntary disruption of custody
over an extended period of time. Id. at 546, 356 N.E.2d at 281, 387 N.Y.S.2d at
824.
250. Id. at 549, 356 N.E.2d at 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 826 (citing Spence-Chapin
Adoption Serv. v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 204, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937,
944 (1971); Benitez v. Llano, 39 N.Y.2d 758, 759, 349 N.E.2d 876, 876, 384
N.Y.S.2d 775, 775 (1976)).
251. Id. at 550, 356 N.E.2d at 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
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Mrs. Jeffreys. 252 The Court of Appeals criticized the family
court for emphasizing the fitness of the biological mother and
failing to comment on the fitness of the non-parent, especially
Mrs. Jeffreys's inability to adopt the child without the mother's
consent or a finding of abandonment. 253
The Court of Appeals also criticized the appellate division
for "automatically" giving the biological parent custody without
considering the "extraordinary circumstances." 254 The Court of
Appeals thus remanded the case for a full hearing into the
"qualifications and background" of both the biological mother
and the non-parent. 255 It instructed the lower court to consider:
the psychologists' testimony that return to the biological mother
would be "traumatic" for the young girl; the length of time the
child was with the non-parent; the circumstances of the non-
parent and her inability to adopt; and the age of the child.256
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals emphasized that the biologi-
cal parent's right to raise his or her own child is paramount over
the rights of non-parents. 257 The court "[plarticularly rejected
... the notion... that third-party custodians may acquire some
sort of squatter's rights in another's child. Third-party custodi-
ans acquire 'rights'. . . only derivatively by virtue of the child's
best interests being considered, a consideration which arises
only after ... the parent's rights and responsibilities have been
displaced."25
2. In re John E.
The issue for this Comment is whether putative fathers
who have not acted promptly to manifest full parental responsi-
bilities, have chosen to "displace" their rights. Bennett and the
best interests hearing have been applied to cases in which the
mother has formally relinquished her parental rights to the
adoptive parents without notifying the father and the father is
trying to gain custody. For example, in In re John E. ,259 the
252. Id.
253. Id. at 551, 356 N.E.2d at 284, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
254. Id. at 550-51, 356 N.E.2d at 284-85, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
255. Id. at 551, 356 N.E.2d at 285, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
256. Id. at 552, 356 N.E.2d at 285, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 828.
257. Id. at 552, 356 N.E.2d at 285, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 828-829.
258. Id. at 552 n.2, 356 N.E.2d at 285 n.2, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 829 n.2.
259. 164 A.D.2d 375, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1990).
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court decided that the petitioner-father did not satisfy the con-
sent requirements under the Raquel Marie standard. 26 0 The
court then stated that the child's best interests "would clearly
be served by permitting him to remain with the only parents he
has known since his birth three years ago."26 1 The John E.
court took the unusual step of analyzing the child's best inter-
ests even after determining that petitioner's consent to the
adoption was not required.262 Income, home accommodations,
psychological examinations, and day care accommodations were
factors the court used to conclude that it was in the child's best
interests to remain with his adoptive parents.26 3
The concurring justice found that the extraordinary cir-
cumstances in the case "combine[d] . . . to militate against a
change in custody."264 In determining what was in the child's
best interests, he relied heavily on the psychologist's testimony
about how the change in custody could effect the child since he
was then three years old.265 Lastly, the concurring judge relied
on Bennett because the particular "extraordinary circumstance"
in Bennett, time, was also the greatest factor in John E.266
The John E. dissent questioned the plurality's reliance on a
"best interest" analysis instead of, or in addition to, the Raquel
Marie two prong standard for determination of consent. 267 The
dissent also relied on Bennett, emphasizing cases which held
that "[a] natural parent may not be deprived of custody of a
child absent a threshold showing of 'surrender, abandonment,
persisting neglect, unfitness or other like extraordinary circum-
stances.' "268 The dissent then stated that a best interests hear-
ing should not be held until the court determines that
extraordinary circumstances exist.269 This would preclude a
court from depriving a natural parent of his child's custody just
260. Id. at 379, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
261. Id. See supra part III.B.2 for further discussion.
262. See 164 A.D.2d at 382-83, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
263. Id. at 382-83, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 444-45.
264. Id. at 388, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 448 (Rosenblatt, J., concurring).
265. Id. at 386-87, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 447.
266. Id. at 375 n.3, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 448 n.3.
267. Id. at 390, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 449 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 393, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (quoting Bennett, 40 N.Y.2d at 544, 356
N.E.2d at 280-81, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 824).
269. Id.
250 [Vol. 15:223
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss1/8
PUTATIVE FATHERS
because it believes "it has found someone better to raise the
child."270
IV. Analysis
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in Stanley
and Caban, the New York legislature was faced with the need to
balance the state's interest in the finality of adoptions, with the
newly competing interests of the putative father. New York
adopted the Supreme Court's two-tiered system of review before
a father could gain custody of his child,271 and then further de-
fined the standards for consent.272 In New York, to gain stand-
ing to veto the adoption of his child, a father must first satisfy
the baseline requirements for notice by demonstrating a com-
mitment to the child.273 Notice will be given to seven categories
of fathers who are deemed to have asserted a minimum level of
parental responsibility. 274 This notice, however, does not guar-
antee an automatic right to veto the adoption of the child; it
only allows standing to demonstrate fitness as a parent at a
consent hearing.275 The unfairness of this legislation to those
not in the seven categories was mitigated by the creation of the
Putative Father Registry.276 The Registry was meant to be a
"simple means" for unwed fathers to establish paternity,
thereby giving them the opportunity to be heard in the event of
a legal change of custody.277 Should a father know of the exist-
ence of his child, all he has to do to be afforded the registry's
protection is mail a postcard to the state registry claiming pa-
ternity.278 The registry therefore provides a means for the fa-
ther to independently establish paternity without relying on the
natural mother to notify him about custody proceedings. The
270. Id.
271. Lehr, 463 U.S. 248. See supra part II.A.4.
272. In 1980, Domestic Relations Law § 111 was amended to require the con-
sent of those fathers of out-of-wedlock children who had met certain statutory cri-
teria. See supra notes 107-08, 113.
273. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
274. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1988). See supra note 108 for
text and corresponding discussion.
275. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111(1)(d), (e) (McKinney 1988).
276. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 n.20 (1983). See also supra note
81.
277. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263 n.20.
278. Id. at 264.
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New York Legislature concluded that a more "open ended notice
requirement would merely complicate the adoption process,
threaten the privacy interests of the unwed mother, create the
risk of unnecessary controversy, and impair the desired finality
of the adoption decrees."279
New York's limited grant of notice was therefore never in-
tended to give putative fathers a presumptive right to custody
of their own children. Domestic Relations Law section 111-a
only gives putative fathers the right to notice to be heard on the
issue of what is in the best interests of their children,280 and
then only if there has been prompt manifestation of parental
responsibility.281
Therefore, although it appears that unwed fathers have
been granted an opportunity to demonstrate that they have de-
veloped a relationship with their children, that opportunity is
given very slight constitutional protection.282 The state has cho-
sen to prescribe strict requirements for notice and consent and
has limited the time within which they can comply. 283 The re-
sult is that an unwed father, ignorant of the existence of the
Putative Father Registry, can be forced to relinquish his right
to a relationship with his child because he did not support that
child in a consistent manner prior to the adoption, and because
the mother chose not to name him on the birth certificate or at
the adoption proceeding.2& This holds true even if the father
would have supported the mother or child had he known of the
pregnancy. Without notice, the father who may be trying to im-
prove his conditions in order to provide consistent support for a
279. Id.
280. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 111-a (McKinney 1988).
281. Raquel Marie II, 76 N.Y.2d at 408, 559 N.E.2d at 428, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
865.
282. For example, in In re John E., although the putative father proved pater-
nity of his child, paid for an obstetric visit, stayed in contact with the mother, and
had filed a petition for declaration of paternity and custody, the court emphasized
that John had not taken any steps to establish legal responsibility for Daniel
within the prescribed six month period. 164 A.D.2d at 380, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
283. See, e.g., In re Robert 0., 80 N.Y.2d 254, 604 N.E.2d 99, 590 N.Y.S.2d 37
(1992). There, the court stated that a father who "promptly" complied with the
terms of the statute as soon as he found out about his son's birth, was still found
not to have complied because "promptness" is to be measured in terms of the baby's
life, not from the time of the father's discovery of the birth. Id. at 264, 604 N.E.2d
at 103, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 41.
284. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111-a(d), (e) (McKinney 1988).
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child he knows is about to be born may never know or learn of
the adoption proceeding. This father would never have the op-
portunity to present his interest in raising the child to the
court. Society has chosen to limit these fathers' rights in favor
of the greater interest in the expediency and finality of
adoptions.285
Problems with the current statutory scheme occur when
the putative father does not know of the birth of his child until
after that child is over six months old, and he is then unable to
demonstrate "prompt" parental responsibility. A father who
does not know of the birth of his child until an adoption proceed-
ing has commenced must overcome the surrender agreement
that the natural mother has already executed. New York's So-
cial Services Law section 384(5) provides that if the child has
been placed with the adoptive parents for more than thirty days
following an executed surrender agreement, then no action may
be commenced by the surrendering parent to revoke the surren-
der or to vest the child's custody in any person other than the
surrendering parent. 286 This becomes important in a situation
where the father and mother reconcile so that the mother con-
sents to a change in custody from the adoptive parents to that of
the father. If more than thirty days have elapsed following the
mother's surrender agreement, neither natural parent has
standing to regain custody by revoking the surrender.287
Once a child has been placed in an adoptive home based on
a valid surrender agreement, the biological parents have no
rights of custody superior to those of the adoptive parents.2, As
a consequence, once both sets of parents are presented with the
opportunity to argue their fitness, custody shall be based solely
on the best interests of the child, and there is no legal presump-
tion that either the adoptive, or the natural parents are more
"fit."289 The reality is, however, that once a child has lived in
the home of her adoptive parents during the year or more that it
takes to conclude contested adoption proceedings, the more
likely that the court will decline to remove the child from that
285. In re Robert 0., 80 N.Y.2d 254, 604 N.E.2d 99, 590 N.Y.S.2d 37 (1992).
See supra part III.B.5.
286. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(5) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
287. See supra note 14.
288. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384(6) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
289. Id.
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home. 290 As unfair as this seems to a biological father who has
just discovered his paternity, it avoids the situation where a
toddler is wrenched from the only home and place of security
she has ever known.
Thus, it is ironic that the only way a putative father will
receive notice of an impending adoption is if he has already
manifested a parental relationship. Even notice, however, does
not mean his consent is necessary unless he further fulfills the
requirements of Domestic Relations Law section 111(1)(d) or
the interim standards set forth in Raquel Marie.291 If not, then
the most the putative father will be allowed is the opportunity
to present evidence relevant to the best interests of the child. 292
At this time in New York, a pregnant woman has no duty to
disclose the name of the father of her child unless she is receiv-
ing funds from the state.293 The mother is deemed to have a
privacy interest that protects her choice not to reveal the name
of the father to the court. 29 4 The dichotomy is due in part to a
joint federal-state program designed to provide medical care for
persons "whose income and resources are insufficient to meet
the costs."295 The Social Security Act requires states to take all
reasonable means to determine the identity and liability of
third parties in order to collect reimbursement for the funds ex-
pended. 296 In New York, section 545 of the Family Court Act
makes a "father," whether or not wed to the mother, liable for
those medical expenses reasonably incurred by the mother dur-
290. See In re John E., 164 A.D.2d 375, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1990). A
plurality of the appellate division refused to remove a three year old from his home
with his adoptive parents after considering the child's "best interests." For further
discussion of John E., see discussion supra parts III.B.2, III.C.2.
291. 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.E.2d 418, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855 (1990).
292. In re Female Infant F., 191 A.D.2d 437, 438, 594 N.Y.S.2d 303, 305 (2d
Dep't 1993).
293. See also Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973) cert. granted, Roe
v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391, vacated, 422 U.S. 391 (1975), on remand sub noma. Doe v.
Maher, 414 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated, 432 U.S. 526 (1977).
294. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 369.2(b) (1993) (requiring recipi-
ents of Aid to Families with Dependant Children to provide information about the
child's father's whereabouts, if known, as a condition to receiving funds). See also
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 269 n.2 (1983).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
296. Id.
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ing the pregnancy, and for the expenses of the child.297 At this
time however, neither the Constitution nor the state compel dis-
closure under any circumstances. 298 The court has not yet de-
termined whether disclosure would be constitutional at all.299
Needless to say, a father who has never known of the birth
of his child would not be able to meet the standards established
by the Supreme Court. First, a father who does not know his
child exists would have little reason to hold himself out as the
father of the child. Secondly, his ability to demonstrate "fit-
ness" and "relationship" are also nullified by the impossibility of
spending time with a child that he does not know exists.3 ° Yet,
the New York courts have chosen to treat these fathers con-
servatively in their willingness to give unwed fathers standing
to appear in adoption proceedings. The courts' stance should
not be surprising in light of the state's interest in the family,
301
and its interest in finalizing adoptions of children into intact
family units quickly.
The result has been a tug-of-war between legislatively
granted rights of notice and standing, and conservative inter-
pretations by the courts of those rights granted. The practical
implications of this for those who are adopting from single, un-
wed mothers is a fairly long period of uncertainty during which
an absent biological father can show up to "reclaim" custody.
The potential instability this window period can create in the
home of the adoptive parents should be offset by the knowledge
that, at this time, courts consider the more involved adoptive
parents over a biological father who has shown little interest in
the mother or child up to the date of the contest, as more "fit" for
297. See Steuban County Dep't of Social Serv. v. Deats, 76 N.Y.2d 451, 560
N.E.2d 760, 560 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1990). There, an unwed father objected to the
court's determination that he was liable for the expenses the mother incurred dur-
ing her pregnancy after a determination of filiation had been made. Id. at 454, 560
N.E.2d at 760, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
298. In re Robert 0., 80 N.Y.2d at 266, 604 N.E.2d at 105, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
299. Id.
300. For discussion of the difficulty of re-claiming custody after custody has
been granted pendente lite to the adoptive parents, see Daniel C. Zinman, Father
Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right to Raise his Infant Surrendered for Adop-
tion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971 (1992).
301. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 545-46, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281, 387
N.Y.S.2d 821, 824 (1976) (stating that "[tihe state is parens patriae and always has
been, but it has not displaced the parent in right or responsibility").
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the child, assuming the requirements for standing have been
met, and a fitness hearing has been held. For adoptive parents,
the chances are extremely good that once a child has been re-
leased into their custody, they will be able to finalize that adop-
tion-if only with some delay. Additionally, the father who has
been very involved in the upbringing of his child is less likely to
have his custody revoked by the exclusive actions of the natural
mother. This promotes the state's great interest in the stability
of the home and the welfare of the child.
V. Conclusion
As a consequence of this policy, if a father wishes to contest
the release of his child given up immediately after birth, he
must have manifested a strict level of parental responsibility
prior to the child's birth. Since the mother has complete control
over whether the father is named on the birth certificate, and
whether she will accept money for medical expenses, the only
means left for a father to demonstrate parental responsibility is
to register with the Putative Father Registry, or to file a legal
notice of paternity. The inaccessibility of either of these due to
ignorance of these legal procedures effectively puts one more
block in the path of unwed fathers.
One possible solution to this problem would be to require
all women, not just those receiving state funds, to name the fa-
ther (if known) at the time she files the release of custody forms
with the court. This would not eradicate the problems created
when the mother does not know the identity of the father, or
when the mother commits a knowing fraud to conceal the iden-
tity of the father. It might, however, fill in some of the gaps left
open because of the fathers' ignorance of the existence of the
Putative Father Registry.
Legislation such as this would require the state to discard
some of its long-held biases against unwed fathers, however at-
tractive adoptive couples are, which the state seems reluctant
to do. In terms of protecting children and providing them with
stable, intact family units, the state is more likely to find well-
screened adoptive families "fit" than an unwed father. How-
ever, at least those fathers are now entitled to a minimum de-
gree of due process.
Maria Ashley
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